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1 Introduction
The informational efficiency of equity markets is largely driven by the avail-
ability of information and the impounding of this information into prices by
information-based investors. In reality, the prime investors in these markets
are fund managers who manage funds on behalf of their clients utilising a
range of investment styles, many of which are not information-based. In-
deed, over the last 40 years we have seen a drift away from information-based
fundamental investing to investment styles such as indexing and momentum
investing which draw minimally upon the rich set of information available
to the investor.
The main focus of this paper is on examining the interplay between
managers pursuing a range of investment styles and their clients with our
objective being to provide insights as to the implications of their behaviour
for the pricing process and so market efficiency. Other authors have already
established that index managers and particularly momentum managers have
a harmful impact on the efficiency of pricing within equity markets (e.g.
Bird et al., 2005). We will confirm this finding in this paper within a real-
istic market setting where clients switch between managers based on their
after-fees performance. Indeed perhaps the most important contribution of
this paper stems from the insights that we provide as to the impact that
clients have on market pricing as a consequence of their typical behaviour
of chasing investment performance (Sapp and Tiwari, 2004, Bu and Lacey,
2008). A second important insight that can be gleaned from this paper is
the implications for market efficiency of the costs incurred (and so the fees
charged) by managers pursuing different styles. Indeed, we corroborate the
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) proposition that the costs associated with the
information search that is so important in establishing efficient pricing will
cause clients to “free ride” by investing in index funds and so ensuring that
markets never become truly efficient. As an extension of this we also find
that the lower costs associated with implementing a momentum strategy
contribute to the survival of these types of investors in a world where after-
fees performance is of paramount importance to clients. Of course, it is just
these momentum investors that cause the greatest disruption in market pric-
ing. Finally, and related to these other issues, we provide insights into the
performance of both the different styles of investing and also the different
strategies employed by clients for switching their funds between managers.
The remainder of the paper will be structured as follows. In Section
2, we provide a more detailed background on the evidence relating to the
different investment styles, the behaviour of clients and their relevance for
efficient pricing. We spell out our model in Section 3 while reporting on the
findings from our simulations in Section 4. We will conclude in Section 5
with a summary of our findings.
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2 Background
Fama (1970) highlighted the importance of the role played by rational,
information-based investors in the formation of efficient pricing in capital
markets. It was Grossman (1976; 1977) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
who brought to our attentions the underlying paradox of the existence of
efficient markets where all the information can be backed out of the prices.
They stated that if in a competitive equilibrium arbitrage profits are elim-
inated by fully informative prices, it is impossible for the economy to be
in equilibrium in the first instance, consequently opening a breach in the
efficient market hypothesis. Figlewski (1978) extended the Grossman and
Stiglitz’s model to the case where the accumulated wealth of agents consti-
tutes a determinant of each agent’s demand. In such a setting the market
only becomes informationally efficient if the distribution of wealth converges
to a Pareto-optimal allocation.
More recently, Sargent (1993), Arthur (1995) and Hommes (2001) ques-
tioned the realism of the assumption of strong rationality, and tested whether
efficient pricing would evolve in a market where traders are only bound-
edly rational. Hong and Stein (1999) developed a framework where the
interaction between informed traders (newswatchers), and uninformed (mo-
mentum) traders, both with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) and
bounded rationality, are able to explain the commonly found initial under-
reaction to an information release followed by a subsequent overreaction to a
series of information releases. This stream of research stimulated the devel-
opment in recent years of a literature in heterogeneous agent-based models
(HAM), comprising financial markets populated with agents who are neither
fully-rational nor utilise the full information set (see also Brock and Hommes,
1997; 1998, Lux, 1995; 1998, Brock and LeBaron, 1996, Farmer and Joshi,
2002, and Iori, 2002). Many of these models have relied on computational
methods to evaluate the impact on the price formation process of different
beliefs about the future evolution of prices (see He and Li, 2008) and incor-
porated learning processes based on the relationship between market prices
and available information. The evolutionary learning dynamics have been
implemented using various tools, such as genetic algorithms based on fitness
functions (Lettau, 1997), neural networks structures where traders learn on
lagged prices (see Beltratti and Margarita, 1992), and adaptive belief models
based on discrete choice probability (Brock and Hommes, 1997).
One common element of these various models is that they attribute the
learning process directly to the clients, who evaluate the performance of
their investment strategies, and consequently adapt by switching from a poor
performing strategy to another which on recent evidence offers more promise
(see for instance, Lux, 1995; 1998, and Lux and Marchesi, 1999; 2000). In
contrast, the paper by Berk and Green (2004) propose a model where where
clients react to past managerial performance. Since the agent’s role in capital
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markets is performed by investment managers who commit themselves to a
particular investment style through contracts stipulated with clients, we
propose a more realistic setting where market evolution is driven by the
choices of managers made by the clients. Therefore we develop a dynamic
model where the fund flows to investment managers are determined by the
decisions made by the ultimate investor (clients) as to who will manage their
funds.
There are two critical assumptions in our model relating to the clients’
investment behaviour. First, clients learn about unobservable manager abil-
ity only from their realised past fund performance. Starting with Gruber
(1996), a branch of the mutual fund literature concentrated its attention on
the existence of a smart money effect in markets (see Zheng, 1999 and Sapp
and Tiwari, 2004), which refers to the investors’ proclivity to identify supe-
rior managers based on their recent performance with the important conse-
quence that funds flow from under-performing managers to out-performing
managers. We decided to impound in our model this performance chas-
ing behaviour of investors by incorporating a switching strategy for clients
whereby they periodically reallocate their funds from the worst performing
managers to the best performing manager. To our knowledge, our analy-
sis constitutes the first attempt in the literature to translate the allocation
of money flows by the clients into an indirect learning process for the mar-
ket. Moreover, although unrealistic, we will assume for simplicity and model
tractability that clients would shift 100 per cent of their funds that they have
invested with the worst to the best manager, regardless of their investment
style and any risk connotations.
Second, we recognise that clients pay a fee to managers based on the
dollar value of the funds managed on their behalf. At a general level, the
clients (principals) turn to the managers (agents) because they do not have
the expertise and/or the time to manage the funds on their own behalf. The
managers incur costs in performing the task assigned to them and so charge
a management fee to both cover the costs associated with implementing
their strategy and provide a return to compensate for their business risk.
As these costs and each manager’s business risk will vary with their style of
investment, we would expect to see similar corresponding differences in the
fees that they charge. Once we recognise the imposition of management fees,
we also have to recognise that the clients will measure manager performance
on an after-fees basis resulting in their switching behaviour being based on
after-fee performance. One possible consequence of this is that only a small
number, if any, are likely to be able to outperform the benchmark.
Finally, our boundedly-rational agents extend beyond the fundamental
(rational information-based) manager to also include momentum (trend fol-
lowers) and index (passive) managers. As mentioned previously, it is compe-
tition between fundamental investors that drive efficient pricing in markets.
Below, we establish that this is the case but we also establish that the re-
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turns generated in a market entirely populated by fundamental investors do
not have statistical properties equivalent to those observed in real markets.
We go on to show that it is the interplay between managers following differ-
ing investment styles combined with clients who chase after-fee investment
returns that give rise to a price formation process, and the realisation of
returns, that is typical of those observed in markets.
3 The model
This section describes the model of a simple financial market with one risky
asset (stock) and a riskless asset (cash) that pays a quarterly interest of rf .
The typical time-step in the model is one week with a quarter and a year
being defined as periods of 13 and 52 weeks, respectively. Let pt denote
the cum-dividend price of the stock at week t. Being the unique risky asset
in the market, we also refer to pt as “the benchmark” of the market. The
following subsections will outline the details but it is useful at this stage to
outline the main features of the model:
1. Managers can trade a riskless asset and a risky stock whose funda-
mental price is related to a stochastic earnings growth rate that is
announced every quarter;
2. Managers manage funds on behalf of clients using a range of investment
styles. It is the excess demand of these managers that drives the price
of the risky asset;
3. Managers charge a fee for managing funds on behalf of clients who
periodically evaluate their after-fees performance and have a strategy
for switching their funds between managers based on this performance.
3.1 The economy
The fundamentals in this economy are driven by the quarterly announcement
of the stochastic earning growth rate gt:
gt =
{
g0 − θ(g0 − gt−1) + σt if t = 13k, k = 1, 2, . . .
gt−1 for all other t’s,
where g0 is the long term mean of the process, θ ≥ 0 is related to the speed
of mean reversion to g0, σ is the standard deviation of the noise term and
t ∼ N(0, 1). Hence, {gt, t = 1, . . .} is a piece-wise constant process that
jumps every quarter (13 weeks) when a new value for earnings growth is
made public. The mean reverting process that is used to model the growth
rate can be specified so as to incorporate some special and important cases.
Setting θ = 1, for example, produces quarterly independent normal growth
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rates with mean g0. However, when 0 < θ < 1 there is some degree of serial
correlation among subsequent earning announcements that is consistent with
the empirical literature (Soffer and Walther, 1999).
The fundamental price p∗t of the stock at time t is a piece-wise constant
with jumps corresponding to the announcements Its value can be computed
using the Gordon model to give
p∗t =
λet(1 + g0)
r − g0
where λ > 0 is the fixed payout rate, r is the cost of equity and the earning
per share et is given by:
et =
{
(1 + gt)et−1 if t = 13k, k = 1, 2, . . .
et−1 for all other t’s.
3.2 The managers
We consider several representative fund managers in the market who differ-
entiate themselves on the basis of their investment style which is reflected
by their distinct excess demand functions. If X is the set of managers, we
define the excess demand of manager x ∈ X at time t as
zxt = wxtfxt(pt|Θt),
where wxt is the market share of manager x ∈ X to be defined later, fxt(·) is
a demand function and Θt is the set of parameters and information that is
processed to take trading decisions. Θt may include the fundamental value
p∗t , lagged price values, various multiples and a series of other data about
the state of the economy or the sector in which the firm is operating. In
the following discussion we will omit for simplicity Θt and consider stylised
versions of commonly used strategies based on fundamental analysis, mo-
mentum trading that is dependent upon price movements over some prior
period and passive index replication whose popularity is due to the prefer-
ence of the clients for this low-cost investment style. For concreteness, let
the set of manager be X = {F,M1,M2, I}, whose elements are suggestive of
fundamental, momentum (two managers using different look back periods)
and index management styles. Making the excess demand proportional to
each manager’s market share wxt is an effective way to take into account
the potential impact on pricing of the demand of the individual managers.
While our model has some similarities with Brock and Holmes (1998) and
Chiarella et al (2006), where the number (or proportion) of agents of one
type affects demand, we use instead the fraction of wealth under manage-
ment as a natural measure of size.
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The demand of the fundamental manager at time t is given by
fFt(pt) =

αF (
p∗t
pt
− 1− α¯) if p∗tpt − 1 > α¯;
0 if |p∗tpt − 1| < α¯;
αF (
p∗t
pt
− 1 + α¯) if p∗tpt − 1 < −α¯,
where αF is a scaling coefficient and α¯ defines a no-trading zone when the
price pt is too close to the fundamental p∗t to allow for profitable trading.
Such prudential behaviour of the manager could also be interpreted as a
way to incorporate a premium compensating for transaction costs that are
not explicitly modelled in this paper. The demand fFt(·) is increasing in
the gross return p∗t /pt and it is non-negative (non-positive) when p∗t /pt is
larger (smaller) than 1, capturing the well known intuition that leads to the
purchase of undervalued (sale of overvalued) assets.
The demand of the momentum managers is based on a look back period
of h weeks. Small values of h are typical of short-term momentum managers,
while relatively high values, say h = 26 or more weeks, are used within long-
term trading strategies. We model a simplified version of momentum and
assume that the managers buy (sell) stocks only if the realised weekly return
over a period of h weeks exceeds (is below) some prespecified rate1 α¯. Letting
pit = ( ptpt−h − 1)/h be the weekly return over the past h weeks, the demand
function of the momentum managers is
fMt(pt) =

αM tanh [β (pit − α¯)] if pit > α¯;
0 if |pit| < α¯;
αM tanh [β (pit + α¯)] if pit < −α¯,
where αM is a scaling coefficient and β measures the speed of reaction to
perceived excess growth in the stock returns. We will consider in the fol-
lowing distinct momentum managers, assuming that their strategies differ
only in the look-back parameter h. The boundedness of the tanh(·) function
ensures that the demand of the momentum managers do not increase with-
out control causing prices to reach extreme levels. This is consistent with
evidence that suggests that the signal based on past momentum weakens at
its extremities.
The index manager passively replicates the benchmark pt. He keeps his
stock endowment fixed with no need to alter his portfolio. This is equivalent
to saying that his demand function is trivially given by the null function
fIt(pt) ≡ 0, for all t.
1To cut down the number of parameters we use the same value α¯ that delimits the
no-trade zone for the fundamental manager. More nuanced behaviour could easily be
implemented with different thresholds for different managers.
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If a large amount of wealth is held by the index manager, the available
liquidity in the market is seriously reduced with the potential for consid-
erable time to elapse before prices adjust to reflect any new fundamental
information that is released to the market.
3.3 Price dynamics
We model the evolution of prices as follows. Let Nxt and Qxt be the number
of stocks held and the cash under management of manager x ∈ X at (the
beginning of) time t, when the current price is pt. Being Wxt = Nxtpt +Qxt
the wealth managed by x, the market shares of the price-taking managers
are given by
wxt =
Wxt∑
x∈XWxt
, x ∈ X.
These market shares sum to unity and represent the fraction of the to-
tal wealth which is controlled by each manager. Excess demands zxt =
wxtfxt(pt) for the risky stock can be computed, aggregated and cleared by
the market. The quantities Nx,t+1 and Qx,t+1 are then computed taking
into account interest payments, management fees and flows
Nx,t+1 = Nxt + zxt + N˜xt,
Qx,t+1 = (Qxt − zxtpt)(1 + rf13)−
1
52
Fxt
ρx
100
+ Q˜xt,
where ρx is the management fee rate (in annualised basis points) charged
by the given manager on the fee base Fxt = (Qxt − zxtpt)(1 + rf13) + (Nxt +
zxt)pt and N˜xt, Q˜xt are additional amount of stock and cash that may result
from the periodic decision of some clients to move their holdings2. Fees are
deducted every week from the cash account of the customer, after interest
payments. The amount of the actual imbalance in the aggregate demand
Zt =
∑
x∈X
wxtfxt(pt)
is the cause of the change in the price in the next trading session. We
assume a very simple price adjusting mechanism loosely inspired by the
market maker metaphor (e.g. Day and Huang, 1990).
pt+1 = pt(1 + µZt + σξξt), (1)
where µ > 0 is the speed of reaction to the excess demand, σξ > 0 and
ξt ∼ N(0, 1). The impact function (1) updates the price depending on the
imbalance in demands by buyers and sellers and the noise term is used to
2The substantive discussion of the switching by clients is to be found in the following
subsection.
8
incorporate in the price other factors such as exogenous liquidity shocks.
More importantly, we allow for the presence of other players in the market
and the price is also driven by other agents actively trading in the stock
producing “residual” variation described by ξt. Although other price for-
mation mechanisms could be used in place of (1), there are practical and
technical advantages in the use of a simple impact function. We model a
limited number of managers and representative clients so suggesting that
other market mechanisms such as a continuous double auction would have
been artificial in such a plain environment. Moreover, it suffices in our set-
ting to model demand alone while demand and limit prices are needed in an
order-driven market. Alternatively, prices could be set by equating excess
demand to zero, but some difficulties arise due to the existence of multiple
clearing prices (due to non linearity of demand). Perhaps more critically,
excess demand has discontinuities arising from the dynamic nature of the
wealth shares wxt that are possibly changing due to clients switching among
managers which is a possibility that will be discussed in the next subsection.
An impact function-based price adjustment smooths sudden and unrealistic
price movements that occasionally occur by setting excess demand to zero.
The form of (1) allows the price dynamics to be tuned to get some de-
sired properties. For example, suppose that we want the price to revert
immediately (i.e., in one trading period) to the fundamental value in a mar-
ket populated by 100% fundamentalists and in the absence of noise. This
can be obtained easily, setting αF = 1µ and taking into account that in this
setup we have σξ = 0, wFt = 1 and wxt ≡ 0 for all t, x 6= I.
3.4 Customers and switching
We consider p representative clients that are endowed with some initial
wealth that is administered by fund managers of their choice. Clients can use
the services of several fund managers at the same time and are characterised
by the vector τ = (τ1, . . . , τp) of times (in years) that separate subsequent
revisions of their portfolios. Let Nixt and Qixt, i = 1, . . . , p be the number
of stocks and cash managed at time t by manager x on behalf of the i-th
client so that, for example, the initial wealth of the client i = 1, . . . , p are
given by
∑
x∈X Nix0p0 +Qix0.
We assume that clients will revise their allocation among the managers
every 52τi weeks, switching funds from the worst manager to the most suc-
cessful one. This performance chasing behaviour of clients mimics a crude
learning process in which customers punish the worst results and reward the
best ones, leaving unaffected the funds deposited by other, medium ranked,
managers. The decisions taken by agents are sharp, in the sense that are
based on rank and are not smoothly dependent on some performance mea-
sure but, at the same time, they also embed some inertia because middle-
ranking managers (neither the best nor the worst) neither gain nor lose their
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clients.
We assume that switching involves transferring the endowments of stock
and cash currently held by one manager to another manager and so involves
no transactions in the market. This is akin to common practice as it min-
imises transfer costs and allows the new manager to revise the portfolio in
accordance with their preferences and at a time of their choosing thus avoid-
ing relatively large transactions that could possibly interfere with the price
dynamics.
We allow some τi to be ∞ to mean that the client never revises his
initial choice of managers. The behaviour of such a client is then a pure
“buy and hold” strategy with respect to their managers in contrast to the
switching behaviour of the i-th client which is based on the comparison of the
performances of the managers undertaken every 52τi weeks where the client
ranks the managers on the basis of their computed risk-adjusted, after-fee
returns relative to the benchmark. He then moves all of his wealth under
the management of the worst performing manager to the best performing
manager. Notice, that if no wealth is managed by the worst fund, this may
result in zero net flow to the best manager, as there is no wealth to move
whatsoever. More formally, let t∗ = 52kτi be a revision date3 for the agents
i ∈ S ⊆ {1, . . . , p} and denote by yxt the weekly excess return with respect
to the benchmark of the fund x at any time t:
yxt =
Wxt −Dxt
Wx,t−1
− pt
pt−1
,
where Dxt is the net inflow that the fund may have experienced due to
switchings at date t. Each agent in S computes a performance measure
Pixt∗ for each manager (empirical annualised excess return less standard
deviation over a period of τi years) as
Pixt∗ = 52 Avg({yx,t∗−52τi−1, . . . , yxt∗})−η
√
52 StDev({yx,t∗−52τi−1, . . . , yxt∗}),
where η > 0. Based on the previous measure, the client ranks the funds from
the best to the worst, denoted by xi and xi, where we omit the reference to
t∗ to simplify notation:
xi = arg max{Pixt∗ , x ∈ X}, xi = arg min{Pixt∗ , x ∈ X}.
The cash and the stock endowment of the switching clients i ∈ S are then
moved from the manager xi to xi. Formally,
Q˜xt∗ =
∑
i∈S,x¯i=x
Qixit∗ −
∑
i∈S,xi=x
Qixit∗ ,
N˜xt∗ =
∑
i∈S,x¯i=x
Nixit∗ −
∑
i∈S,xi=x
Nixit∗ .
3The same t∗ can be a revision date for more than one agent. If, say, τ = (∞, 1, 3, 5)
then t∗ = 260 is a revision date for 2 agents (S = {2, 4}) as 260 is divisible by 52 and 260
(1 and 5 years).
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rf 0.005 Interest rate (quart.)
r 0.02 Cost of equity (quart.)
g0 0.01 Mean growth rate (quart.)
θ 0.5 Speed of mean reversion in growth
σ 0.01 Noise in growth
h1, h2 6,26 Lookback periods of mom. managers
α¯ 0.03/13 No-trade parameter
αF
1
µ Scaling coefficient of fundamentalist manager
αM 0.025 Scaling coefficient of momentum managers
β 50 Reaction coefficient of momentum managers
λ 0.8 Payout rate
µ 1.0 Speed of reaction of price to excess demand
σξ 0.02 Noise in price
η 0.5 Risk adjustment coefficient
Table 1: Parameters and brief description (base-case)
If t is not a switching date, then S = ∅ and, by definition, Q˜xt = 0 = N˜xt
for all managers x ∈ X.
4 Results
This section presents the results obtained by simulation of the model. All our
findings are based on 100 simulations over T = 2500 weeks, corresponding
to roughly 50 years of trading. Unless explicitly noted we consider markets
where one fundamental, two momentum and one index managers are avail-
able. Hence, m = 4 and X = {F,M1,M2, I}. We assume that there are
p = 4 customers with revision frequencies τ = (∞, 1, 3, 5) years. In general
we stipulate a starting situation where each client invests a equal amount
with each manger and hence the initial market shares are equal to 25% for
all managers, wx0 = 0.25, ∀x ∈ X, and the values of the other parameters
are as given in Table 1.
The initial prices p0 = p∗0 = 81.6 are given in the base-case by the Gordon
valuation formula, based on the specified values for the parameters4, and we
let Nix0 = 4 · 95wx0 and Qix0 = 4 · 5wx0p0 be the starting stock units and
cash amount, so that all funds initially invest 95% of their wealth in equity.
We start by discussing some possibly unrealistic configurations that are
nevertheless very useful in order to see the market dynamics in extreme
cases. The next subsection will be devoted to the cases where only fun-
4To start the simulation, lagged prices for h = max(h1, h2) periods are needed by
the momentum managers. We set p−j = p01+jrf/13 , j = 1, . . . , h so that no initial fake
momentum is created.
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θ µ αM β Description
Case 1 No switching and no fees Preliminary cases
Case 2 No fees, ρ = (0, 0, 0, 0)
Case 3 1 Growth process
Case 4 0.25
Case 5 1.5 Price dynamics
Case 6 0.5
Case 7 0.05 Momentum strength
Case 8 100
Case 9 No switching Robustness
Case 10 70% fundam., wF0 = 0.7
wM10 = wM20 = wI0 = 0.1
Case 11 Fundam. and index
wF0 = wI0 = 0.5
Case 12 σξ = 0.01
Table 2: Different cases considered
damentalists are present, switching is not allowed and no fees are charged.
We then move towards considering a specific set of parameters that we will
describe as our “base-case” and which will be shortly discussed in more
detail (see Table 1) The time series obtained in the base-case are reason-
ably realistic, suggesting that the model is capturing many of the actual
features of the market. We will then change some key parameter, keeping
the others fixed as in the base-case in order to enlighten the features of the
model and to provide a robustness analysis of the results. We examine the
issues related to the optimal switching frequency (from the point of view of
a profit-maximising customer) in Subsection 4.4. The whole design of our
simulations is described in Table 2.
4.1 Some preliminary cases
Consider the following extreme situation where the market consists solely
of the fundamental manager, wF0 = 1, wx0 = 0,∀x 6= F , and there is no
external noise, that is σξ = 0. As noted before, if αF = 1/µ and α¯ = 0 then
the price immediately reacts to the earning announcement and adjusts to the
correct fundamental level. In fact, assuming that before the announcement
the price and fundamental values are p and p∗ and that some growth rate
g is made public, the new fundamental value (after the announcement) is
(1 + g)p∗ and the demand of the unique manager in the market is fF =
αF (
(1+g)p∗
p − 1) = 1µ( (1+g)p
∗
p − 1). As there is no other source of demand,
this is also the aggregate demand Z and the new price is given by (1) to
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yield
p (1 + µfF ) = (1 + g)p∗,
proving that the price reverts immediately to the correct new fundamental
price. This is as one would expect as we have previously indicated that mar-
kets composed of information-based fundamental investors is an important
requirement to give rise to efficient pricing within markets. Even when noise
is present (σξ 6= 0), on average the price is equal to the fundamental value
and departures are local and purely driven by idiosyncratic noise.
Consider now a slightly more realistic setting where all four managers
commence with an equal share of the market, wx0 = 0.25, ∀x ∈ X, but still
with no fees charged by managers nor any switching by clients (case 1 in
Table 2). The first row of Table 3 shows some statistics relating to the sim-
ulations in this case. The volatility of the resulting price is 2.11% (weekly)
and the mispricing, namely the standard deviation of the relative difference
of price and fundamental value, is 3.32%. Both the final and the average lev-
els of wealth reported in Table 3 indicate that it is the fundamental manager
who gains market share under such a setting. This gain in market share by
the fundamental manager is a consequence of him outperforming the other
managers. Table 4 reports the excess returns of the managers (left) and of
the clients (right), in basis points (bp). In other words, if no fees are charged
and clients do not switch between managers, the fundamental manager is
able to provide small but persistent superior returns (0.5 bp as seen in the
left part of the first row of Table 4)5.
Allowing now for clients to switch between managers but still in the ab-
sence of fees and with equal proportions initially allocated to each of the
managers, produces the results of the second row of Tables 3 and 4 (case
2). Switching increases the volatility of the price but reduces the level of
mispricing, making the market more efficient. This happens because a large
fraction of wealth moves from the index to the fundamental manager, as it
is evident by reference to the levels of final and average wealth under man-
agement as reported in Table 3. The fractions of wealth managed by the
index (fundamental) funds changes on average from 25% to 6.75% (25% to
47.90%), respectively, due to the small but sustained superior performance
of the fundamental manager. This is confirmed by the performance of man-
agers as reported in Table 4, that shows that the best (worst) manager are
likely to be the fundamental (index) manager. The two momentum man-
agers most frequently rank second and third and so neither gain nor lose
clients, but when they do rank first or last, the aggregate of their cashflows
largely offset each other.
We have so far seen that, when switching is allowed in the absence of fees,
the fundamental manager increases his funds under management largely at
5The reason why the managers underperform the benchmark is that they hold cash in
their portfolios whereas the benchmark is entirely composed of one stock.
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Desc. stats
Final wealth Avg wealth
under management under management
Price Fund.
Mis. F M1 M2 I F M1 M2 I
vol. vol.
Case 1 2.11 0.42 3.32 25.05 24.99 24.98 24.98 25.02 24.99 24.99 24.99
Case 2 2.44 0.41 2.64 47.90 20.56 24.80 6.75 46.65 19.26 24.97 9.12
Base 2.07 0.41 6.04 8.19 28.04 20.56 43.22 8.40 30.73 21.57 39.30
Case 3 2.07 0.38 5.99 8.26 27.98 20.80 42.96 8.50 29.35 21.93 40.23
Case 4 2.07 0.48 6.02 7.54 29.01 23.28 40.16 8.61 29.98 23.63 37.78
Case 5 2.06 0.41 7.47 9.31 26.56 19.82 44.30 9.13 28.66 22.02 40.18
Case 6 2.11 0.42 4.02 7.14 26.48 22.14 44.24 7.88 28.96 22.62 40.54
Case 7 2.33 0.41 11.21 10.34 22.98 18.07 48.61 9.82 27.67 21.69 40.83
Case 8 2.13 0.41 8.00 7.71 27.63 22.64 42.02 8.84 28.84 23.51 38.81
Case 9 2.16 0.41 2.88 23.48 24.96 24.96 26.60 24.12 24.98 24.98 25.91
Case 10 2.15 0.41 3.17 18.18 10.24 8.89 62.69 20.54 11.34 9.60 58.52
Case 11 2.08 0.41 4.08 13.83 - - 86.17 16.49 - - 83.51
Case 12 1.03 0.41 2.84 7.42 23.48 20.98 48.12 8.12 26.12 23.59 42.17
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and flows (averaged across 100 simulations of
5000 weeks). The first three columns show the percentage standard devia-
tion of price, growth rate and the relative mispricing (standard deviation of
pt−p∗
p∗ ). The columns 4-7 (8-11) report the final (time-averaged) wealth for
each manager.
the expense of the index manager. At the same time, switching on the part
of customers is beneficial to the efficiency of the market, as it is moving
more funds to the unique trader that correctly impounds fundamental in-
formation into prices. However, the price produced in all of the previously
discussed environments is not realistic as the returns are strongly negatively
correlated6. This is almost trivial given that most of the trading is under-
taken by the fundamental manager and the price quickly reverts to the fair
valuation as soon as it departs from it for some reasons. Moreover, the
assumption of no fees is clearly at odds with reality and in the following
section we examine a much more realistic case where clients switch among
managers (chasing after-fees performance).
4.2 The base-case
In this subsection we introduce a set of reasonable fee levels for each manager
that reflect both the costs and the risks associated with realizing their par-
6Cont (2001) and Pagan (1996) are good surveys of the common properties of financial
time series (also known as stylized facts).
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Performance of Performance of
managers (bp) customers (bp)
F M1 M2 I τ =∞ τ = 1 τ = 3 τ = 5
Case 1 -6.12 -6.61 -6.65 -6.68 -6.48 -6.48 -6.48 -6.48
Case 2 -6.28 -6.48 -6.48 -6.58 -6.35 -6.28 -6.32 -6.33
Base -36.24 -26.79 -26.39 -11.86 -25.99 -22.73 -20.21 -20.22
Case 3 -34.21 -25.88 -25.59 -11.66 -25.15 -21.96 -19.41 -19.60
Case 4 -36.87 -26.68 -26.53 -11.63 -25.91 -22.82 -20.51 -20.17
Case 5 -34.85 -26.34 -26.16 -11.44 -25.68 -22.59 -19.91 -19.77
Case 6 -35.33 -26.07 -25.74 -11.96 -25.29 -21.68 -19.41 -19.71
Case 7 -33.76 -26.68 -26.60 -10.71 -25.76 -22.41 -20.13 -20.21
Case 8 -34.20 -26.07 -25.94 -11.45 -25.33 -22.49 -19.93 -19.75
Case 9 -38.84 -26.10 -26.14 -12.91 -25.95 -25.95 -25.95 -25.95
Case 10 -37.13 -26.23 -26.14 -11.56 -33.49 -17.10 -16.04 -16.69
Case 11 -35.77 - - -11.90 -24.98 -15.39 -13.46 -13.71
Case 12 -37.09 -26.10 -25.95 -11.80 -25.67 -20.85 -19.56 -19.78
Table 4: Performance of managers (left) and customers (right). In detail,
the annualized excess return with respect to benchmark pt is shown. Al
figures are expressed in basis points (bp).
ticular strategy: the fee structure that we implement is ρ = (50, 30, 30, 10)
bp. This then becomes our base-case and we examine the impact of these
fees on the volatility of the price, mispricing, flows among the managers and
performances of funds and customers. Table 1 contains the values of the
parameters of this base-case.
The plot of the actual (benchmark) price pt and the fundamental price
(in red) in Figure 1 clearly establishes the existence of a strong relationship
between the two sets of prices but it also highlights there are persistent and
sizeable deviations between the two. The quarterly growth rate in earn-
ings over time as depicted in the left lower panel of Figure 1 highlights the
the mean-reverting nature of the earning process around the quarterly long
term mean g0 = 1% (in red) which give rise to excursions that are “misinter-
preted” by momentum traders and fuel sustained trading. Observe that the
earnings growth rate is constant between two announcement dates and that
there are episodes of prolonged negative outcomes that cause a reduction in
the fundamental price. Despite the correlation in the earnings growth rates,
that is driving the price, and the presence of fundamental and momentum
managers that should induce negative and positive correlation, respectively,
the returns of the benchmark are uncorrelated as shown in Figure 1 on the
right7. The extreme weakness of the linear structure makes the price virtu-
7A Box-Ljung test with 10, 20, 30 lags cannot reject at the 1% confidence level the
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Figure 1: Benchmark (black) and fundamental price (red), left upper panel.
Growth rate in black, left lower panel. The level of g0 = 0.01 is depicted as
a red horizontal line. The right graph shows the autocorrelation function of
the benchmark returns.
ally unpredictable using linear models based on past observations and this
is a robust feature of all the simulations in this parameters’ configuration8.
The mispricing of 6.04% for this base case, as seen in Table 3, is much
larger than that reported for the two cases discussed in the previous subsec-
tion where there were no management fees charged. Hence, the introduction
of the fees appears to be responsible for a decrease in the efficiency of the
market. The density of the mispricing shown in Figure 2 is not symmetric
around zero with there being more instances where the actual price is be-
low the fundamental value. This is to be expected as, on average, earning
announcements increase the fundamental value and the price is left behind,
taking some time to recover. On the other hand, the same effect is ultimately
responsible for the fat right tail. Normally, the fundamental manager is ac-
countable for the initial increase of the price after a positive earning rate
is made public and the subsequent movement in the actual price over time
towards the fundamental price. This trend in price triggers the entry of the
momentum managers who subsequently push the actual price well beyond
the fundamental price.
The right exhibit of Figure 2 documents the autocorrelation of the mis-
null hypothesis of linear independence of the price, producing p-values of 0.709, 0.063 and
0.019.
8The following subsection will examine situations where some linear predictability can
unavoidably be detected due to the large weight of the fundamental manager or due to
the massive activity of the momentum managers.
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Figure 2: Density of the mispricing. The mode of the distribution is negative
and there are examples of “bubbles” where the price exceeds the fundamen-
tal value by more than 30%.
pricing, establishing that a large deviation between the actual price and the
the fundamental price at time t is likely to persist over an extended time
period. This reflects that only a minority of the demand is coming from the
fundamental manager with the possibility that some of the other managers
are taking an opposing stance.
A representation of the flow dynamics is depicted in Figure 3 with the
index manager (in blue) initially attracting funds from the fundamental
manager as the jumps in his wealth under management clearly show. In
this instance, the index fund loses a portion of his wealth between weeks
1000-1500, when the long-term momentum manager (in green) outperforms
the short-term fund (in red, initially covered by the green line). At the end
of this simulation the managers (F, M1, M2, I) retain 5.8%, 12.3%, 30.8%
and 51.1% of the wealth, respectively.
The middle (right-hand) portion on the right of Table 3 reports the
final (average) proportion of the total wealth under management by each of
the four managers, averaged over 100 simulations per case. The base-case
row shows that the index fund is on average managing 39.30% of the total
wealth, to be contrasted with the initial proportion of 25% (constant for all
funds). Due to our switching mechanism, the index manager who frequently
ranks first wins funds off the fundamental manager who often is the worst
performer as revision dates. With some exceptions demonstrated by weeks
1352 and 1404 in Figure 3, when the short-term manager looses funds to
the advantage of the fundamental and index ones, the two momentum funds
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Figure 3: Wealth under management for the different funds. The wealth
of the fundamental, short/long-term momentum and index managers are
shown in black, red, green and blue. Notice the log scale on the y-axis.
most commonly rank second or third and thus avoid in- and out-flows.
The base-case row of Table 4 reports on the left (right) the after-fees
annualised excess returns (in basis points) of the managers (clients). The
fundamental manager is losing -36.24 bp per year relative to the benchmark
and it is clearly outperformed by the index manager and both momentum
managers. Given that the volatilities of the excess returns are approximately
the same for all funds, such low performance explains the flow to the index
manager.
The conclusion that the fundamental managers is the worst of the man-
agers needs to be qualified after taking into account the fees levied. Losing
36.24 bp per year after 50 bp of fees actually (albeit crudely) means that the
manager is able to generate a positive excess return of 13.76 bp before-fees
under the base-case. For comparison the excess return before-fees of the
other managers are 3.21, 3.61 and -1.86 bp. The momentum managers can
generate a limited excess profit, exploiting the pseudo-cycles generated by
the earning announcement process and their own herding. Not surprisingly,
the index manager is unable, by definition, to reap gains. The flows away
from the fundamental manager are not due to his lack of skills but rather
to the simple fact that he is deserted by his performance-chasing clients as
a consequence of his outperformance being insufficient to cover the costs
associated with implementing a fundamental strategy.
The negative after-fees performances of the fundamental manager will
be further discussed in the final section. In the next sub-section we perform
18
an extensive robustness analysis of our results by way of varying the values
of several parameters.
4.3 Robustness analysis
We explore in this subsection the sensitivity of our results to variations in
the base-case parameters. Simulations are undertaken to determine whether,
our findings are affected by i) changes in the process for generating earnings;
ii) variation in the speed of price adjustment; iii) changes in the aggressive-
ness of trading by momentum managers and iv) modifications of several
other parameters.
Cases 3 and 4 change the mean-reversion coefficients of the growth pro-
cess for earnings. When θ = 1 earnings are uncorrelated while if θ = 0.25,
the correlation in the announcements increases relative to the base-case. In
both cases, negligible changes are found in volatility, mispricing, flows and
performance, showing that finer details in the earnings’ generation process
are unlikely to be relevant.
Changing the speed of adjustment µ of the price relative to demand
imbalances can have important consequences for the results. In case 5 we
increase µ by 0.5 while we decrease it by the same amount in Case 6. As
expected, more reactive prices movements inflate the mispricing to almost
7.5% (case 5), while smoother adjustments (µ = 0.5, case 6) reduce it to
4%. The previously shown patterns in flows and performance are, however,
rather stable: we still see a definite movement away from the fundamental
towards the index manager. Overall, there is little doubt that the basic
findings holds over a fairly wide range of values for µ.
Cases 7 and 8 explore some of the parameters of the demand function of
the momentum managers. In both cases, the impact of momentum-driven
demand is increased if compared to the base-case. The demand of the mo-
mentum managers is proportional to αM . In a related (but subtly different)
way, increasing β raises the sensitivity to the momentum that is needed in
order to buy/sell a given quantity of the asset. Unsurprisingly, inflating the
demand of the momentum investors generated by any given signal has some
disruptive effects, as the volatility and, in particular, the level of mispricing
increases. Larger deviations from the fundamental price are observed and
the time series exhibit wide swings and some pseudo-cyclic behaviour. Ob-
serve that this increased aggressiveness of the momentum investors produces
mild, but statistically significant, positive serial correlation in the returns.
As far as the flows are concerned, the increased activity of the momentum
managers does not always equate with an increase in their wealth under
management, that is indeed reduced in case 7 and remains approximately
the same for the aggregate of two momentum funds in case 8, even though
there is a slight improvement in their performance. The reason that the
improved performance does not translate into more funds under manage-
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ment is due to an increase in the volatility of the returns of the momentum
managers that impacts on their risk-adjusted performance.
The final cases, from 9 to 12, are testing the model under several other
variations of the base-case parameters. For instance, the inability to switch
in Case 9 results in a reduction in client returns by about 5 bp per year
relative to the base case. Interestingly, in a market where fees are charged,
the absence of switching would result in the level of mispricing being halved
relative to the base case but we do not believe that clients behaviour is
driven by the efficiency of markets but rather by the possibility of realising
individual gains.
In case 10, the fundamental manager has initially a very large fraction
of the funds under management, 70%, while the other managers equally
share the remaining 30%. Not surprisingly, the market prices become more
efficient with the greater influence of the fundamental manager but again
we see the large transfer of funds under management from the fundamental
manager to the index manager. This finding is confirmed under case 11
where only the fundamental and the index manager are available to clients,
i.e. X = {F, I}.
Finally, case 12 shows that our findings are robust to a change of the
size σξ of the exogenous noise that contributes to the price adjustment.
4.4 The role of switching
It is of great interest to examine the importance of switching for profit-
chasing clients. An examination of the right section Table 4 shows that no-
switching (τ = ∞) is an inferior strategy relative to the switching strategy
of the other three clients. Reviewing their managers every τ = 3 or τ = 5
years produces very similar performances that are preferable to switching
every year (column τ = 1), with small additional returns of 1 to 2.5 bp in
most cases.
A low frequency revision and switching strategy provides gains ranging
from about 6 bp in the base-case to almost 20 bp per year in case 10, if
compared to the buy-and-hold strategy of τ = ∞ (i.e. Case 9). In other
words, there is evidence that evaluating managers periodically every 3 or
5 years and switching accordingly yields statistically greater returns with
respect to the no-switching option. The economic significance of this result
is, however, less evident. Even in our setting, where we compare managers
that use different investment styles but keep an average identical exposure
to equity (95% of the wealth) so that large differences in returns are unlikely,
a few basis points may not be enough to justify portfolio reallocation. Some
back-of-the-envelope computations, for example, show that revising every
5 years is on average producing 5 · 5.8 = 29 bp of cumulated excess gains
in the base-case. Small switching costs, even of psychological or cognitive
type, would totally wipe out the gains arising from reallocation on the part
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of the customer that may just be satisfied with a constant mix.
5 Conclusions
One characteristic of modern equity markets is that they are populated by
managers pursuing a range of investment styles. Even more importantly,
many of these styles utilise little or none of the available information and
so bring into question the extent to which information will be quickly im-
pounded into prices. Indeed, available evidence suggests that many of these
styles, but particularly momentum investing, are disruptive to the pricing
within these markets. One question that this raises is the longevity of this
situation with the possibility that a learning process that operates in these
markets will result in the demise of the offending managers and so result in
a return to efficient markets dominated by information-based investors.
In this paper we investigate a market composed of fundamental, mo-
mentum and index managers who manage funds on behalf of several clients.
Learning in our model comes by way of the clients who in the pursuit of
better investment returns periodically switch their funds from the worst-
performing manager to the best-performing manager. Another important
aspect of our model is the fact that managers charge for their services to not
only recover their costs but also to generate a fair level of profit. Our simu-
lations show that in such an environment, switching actually contributes to
the mispricing as funds actually flow from the stabilising fundamental man-
ager to the index manager as a result of their inferior after-fee performance
attributable to their higher cost structure. In other words a combination
of costly active management with performance-chasing clients leads to sus-
tainable and extended mispricing within markets. Further, we confirm that
these findings are not simply a consequence of the parameterisation of our
base case and are likely to be representative of today’s equity markets that
feature managers pursuing a diverse range of investment styles, who charge
for their services and who manage on behalf of clients whose main concern
is to maximise the after-fees returns on their investments.
Other findings that can be drawn from our simulations include confirma-
tion that it is the momentum managers that are the main destabilising force
within markets, that index funds might be the most cost-effective means for
managing funds but that their presence does contribute to inefficiencies in
the pricing within markets, and that switching based on past performance
might appear to offer an opportunity to enhance investment returns but any
improvement is likely to be largely wiped out by switching costs.
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